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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN NEWSPAPER

LIBEL
ROBERT

H.

WETTACH*

On the front page of the Columbia Record, an afternoon paper
published in Columbia, S. C., the following article appeared:
"Facsimile of a Letter from Senator T. C. Duncan to Edwin W.
Robertson, of Columbia.
"Senator Duncan is a member of the Canal Commission. He
was appointed on March 23, 1923. The act creating the commission
was passed by the General Assembly during the session of 1923, and
was approved March 26, 1923. Senator Duncan's letter is dated
March 28, 1923. The loan solicited was not granted. The first
meeting of the Canal Commission was held in Columbia April 13,
1923.
"After five days return to T. C. Duncan, Union, S. C. To E. W.
Robertson, c/o Loan & Exchange Nat. Bank.
"Personal.
"T. C. Duncan, Union, S. C. To E. W. Robertson, Columbia,
S. C. March 28, 1923.
"Dear Sir: I would like to secure a loan of $25,000.00-for
three years-interest payable semi-annually. I have security worth
six times the amount of loan desired.
"I will be glad for you to have your representative to inspect the
property that I would offer as collateral-I can make loan from a
bank, but I do not desire the constant renewal of paper. I 'have
Building & Loan stock that will mature in three years, by means of
which loan will be paid at maturity.
"If there is any one in the state who could handle the above
matter, you are the individual-I would thank you for your early
reply.
"Very truly. (Signed) T. C. Duncan."
Mr. Duncan brought action of libel against the Record Publishing Company and Mr. Robertson who furnished the letter to the
newspaper, claiming $50,000 damages. The jury after a very short
deliberation-the case went to the jury at 6 o'clock and the judge
was called from his residence and was back in the court room at
6:30 to hear the verdict-gave the plaintiff the $50,000 for which
he asked. The lower court refused a new trial and the Supreme
Court of South Carolina has recently affirmed the result.1
* Professor of Law, University of North Carolina.
1

Duncan v. Record Publishing Co., 143 S. E. 31 (S. C., 1927).
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The plaintiff alleged that the publication in connection with certain extrinsic facts was susceptible of conveying the inference that
he was soliciting a bribe. The facts relied on were: (1) that the
Canal Commission had power to settle a litigation then pending
between the State of South Carolina and the Columbia Railway, Gas
and Electric Company; (2) that Mr. Robertson owned a controlling
interest in that company; (3) that on the morning of the publication
-about a year after the date of the letter in question-Mr. Duncan,
rising to a point of personal privilege in the Senate, had made a
bitter attack upon Mr. Robertson and the press of Columbia. Senator Duncan's speech was vigorous and scathing, alleging that Mr.
Robertson was an octopus improperly influencing the newspapers
and dominating chambers of commerce in order to persuade the
Canal Commission to settle the litigation in question for the selfish
purpose of protecting his own interests.
The defense set up was that the publication was true, that it
was made in self defense and therefore privileged, and, in addition,
the newspaper set up the privilege of fair comment. At the trial
the evidence was clear that the plaintiff was a man of character and
standing, the son of a bishop and actively engaged in business and
politics for many years. The defendant, Robertson, was a prominent
business man of Columbia, president of a leading bank which had
absorbed a number of smaller banks, and the owner of the controlling interest in the Columbia Railway, Gas and Electric Company,
furnishing the city with street cars, gas and electric power. Mr.
Robertson had at one time purchased the Columbia Record and had
set up one of his employees in charge of it who continued as owner
and editor of the paper. The paper owed Mr. Robertson about
$40,000 and owed the bank about $56,000. Mr. Robertson had been
active in developing electric power and had been influential in keeping the competing Southern Power Company out of Columbia. He
had a month or two before the trial changed his domicile to Maine
where, as he testified, he intended to retire, being worth as least
$300,000, or, as he said, "it is near enough for the purpose of this
case." As to the letter in question, Mr. Duncan testified that he was
requesting a bona fide loan upon proper security. Both Mr. Robertson and the editor of the paper testified that they thought the letter
would subject Mr. Duncan to criticism and Mr. Robertson stated
that he was very much worried when he received the letter "because,"
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as he testified, "I knew if I declined I would run the risk of incurring
the enmity of a member of the Canal Commission, and if I made
the loan I would make myself liable to be suspected for trying to
influence the commission." But there was no evidence beyond this
of the purpose of the defendants to infer the solicitation of a bribe
and no other evidence of express malice on either hand, and they
expressly disclaimed any defamatory purpose.
Nevertheless, the verdict indicates that the jury believed that the
defendants acted with actual malice, and the amount of the verdict
indicates that they gave something by way of punitive damages.
The plaintiff neither alleged nor proved any pecuniary loss, so that
the damages were entirely for injury to reputation and feelings.
It is natural that a case of such interest should involve many
features but the present discussion will be limited to the following:
1. Extrinsic facts necessary to render words libelous.
2. Proving the truth of a libelous charge.
3. Privilege of self-defense-provocation.
4. Suggested newspaper privilege of publishing true facts concerning public officers.
I
EXTRINSIC FACTS NECESSARY TO RENDER WORDS LIBELOUS
At the very start of the Duncan case, the trial judge was faced
with the problem of deciding whether there was a case to submit to
the jury. On its face, the publication seemed innocent enough. However, the plaintiff contended that it conveyed a defamatory inference
in view of the extrinsic facts above mentioned. Is the publication
capable or susceptible of such an inference? "The law is perfectly
well settled. Before a question of libel or slander is submitted to a
jury, the court must be satisfied that the words complained of are
capable of the defamatory meaning ascribed to them. That is a
matter of law for the court. If they are so, and also of a harmless
meaning, it is a question of fact for a jury which meaning they did
'2
convey in the particular case.
'Stubbs, Ltd. v. Russell [1913] A. C. 386, 393; Newell, SLANDER AND

LiBaE. (4th ed.), §§247, 248; Commercial Publishing Co. v. Smith, 149 Fed.
704 (C. C. A. 6th., 1907), especially pp. 706-707 where Lurton, J., says, "A
publication claimed to be defamatory must be read and construed in the sense
in which the readers to whom it is addressed would ordinarily understand it.
So the whole item, including display lines, should be read and construed together, and its meaning and signification thus determined. When thus read,

6
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A recent Colorado case 8 involved a number of newspaper articles
and cartoons charging the governor with a pardon orgy"-"most
shocking pardon scandal in state's history"-"for months rumors
have been afloat that money, and lots of it, has been responsible for
the release of prisoners"-"a $30,000 slush fund is working in Max's
behalf, it is declared and his friends are boasting that the parol is
assured. The money, it is said, is being scattered right and left."
The trial court sustained a demurrer to the complaint, but on appeal
this was reversed, although it is interesting that three dissenting
judges agreed with the lower court that the publications were not
susceptible of a libelous interpretation as charging bribery or official
corruption. The majority of the court, however, believed that the
publications should have been submitted to the jury under the rule
that where words used are ambiguous in their import or may permit,
in their construction, connection or application, a doubtful or more
than one interpretation, and in some sense be defamatory, the question whether they are such is for the jury.
It is to be noted that the jury is not to determine which of the
two meanings was intended,4 although that way of stating the rule is
sometimes found, 5 but the jury is to say which of the two meanings
would be attributed to it by those to whom it is addressed or by
whom it may be read.6 A newspaper publication must be measured
if its meaning is so unambiguous as to reasonably bear but one interpretation,

it is for the judge to say whether that signification is defamatory or not. If,
upon the other hand, it is capable of two meanings, one of which would be
libelous and actionable and the other not, it is for the jury to say, under all
the circumstances surrounding its publication, including extraneous facts admissible in evidence, which of the two meanings would be attributed to it by
those to whom it is addressed or by whom it may be read." Baker v. Warner,
231, U. S. 588, 34 S. Ct. 175 (1913); Washington Post Co. v. Chaloner, 250
U. S. 290, 39 S. Ct. 448 (1919) ; Peck v. Tribune Co., 214 U. S. 185, 29 S. Ct.
554 (1908) ; McCall v. Sustair, 157 N. C. 179, 72 S. E. 974 (1911) ; Elmore v.
Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 189 N. C. 658, 127 S. E. 710 (1925).
'Morley v. Pub. Co., 268 Pac. 540 (Colo., 1928).
"The actionable or innocent character of words does not depend on the
intention with which they were published. POLLOCK, ToRTs (12th ed.), p. 252;
NEWELL,
(4th ed.),
'The SLANDER
trial judgeAND
in LiBEL
the Duncan case §264.
stated in his charge that the jury is
to determine the sense in which words were published, but the charge as a
whole did not mislead the jury into a consideration of the intention of the
publishers. See McCall v. Sustair, 157 N. C. 179, 72 S. E. 974 (1911), where
three to two decision on this point.
IHulton and Co. v. Jones [1910] A. C. 20, 79 L. J. K. B. 198; Hanson v.
Globe Newspaper Co., 159 Mass. 293, 34 N. E. 462 (1893) ; Washington Post
Co. v. Kennedy, 3 F. (2d) 207 (D. C. A-pp., 1925), all cases of libel by the
coincidence of the plaintiff having the same name as the subject of the pub-

lication; Elmore v. Atlantic Coast Line, 189 N. C. 658, 127 S. E. 710 (1925);
Powell v. Young, 144 S. E. 624 (Va, 1928).
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by its natural and probable effect upon the mind of the average lay
7
reader.
In the Duncan case, 8 Cothran, J., dissenting, argues that the publication is incapable of the inference that the plaintiff was soliciting
a bribe, but that the worst construction possible is that Mr. Duncan
was using his new office to induce favorable action upon his application for a loan; that while'this is an indiscretion, it is far from being
the solicitation of a bribe and a violation of the criminal laws of the
state. But the province of the court is to decide only whether there
is a case to be submitted to the jury. The test for making that
decision has already been stated-in view of the extrinsic circumstances alleged in the complaint, are the words reasonably capable
or susceptible of the defamatory inference alleged by the innuendo
of the plaintiff. Such a possibility is present in the Duncan case,
and the court was right in allowing the case to go to the jury so
that they might be informed of the extrinsic facts and might draw
the proper inference. 9
' Morley v. Pub. Go., 268 Pac. 540 (Colo., 1928), at p. 542; Peck v. Tribune
Co.A 214 U. S. 185, 29 S. Ct. 554 (1908).
Duncan v. Record Pub. Co., 143 S. E. 31, 64-66.
Cases where extrinsic facts were necessary to render the publication libelous: Powell v. Young, 144 S. E. 624 (Va., 1928), additional facts necessary
to identify plaintiff as the subject of the libel; Sydney v. McFadden Newspaper Pub. Corp., 242 N. Y. 208, 151 N. E. 209 (1926), statement that Doris
Keane was Fatty Arbuckle's latest lady love becomes libelous upon showing
that Doris Keane is a married woman; 11 CORN. L. QT. 568; 40 HARV. L. REV.
324; 25 Micrn. L. REv. 551; Fletcher v. Cincinnati Realty Co., 21 Ohio App.
422, 153 N. E. 213 (1926), public announcement that leading hotel refused
to carry out contract for an announced banquet held not libelous where no
libelous reason given for the refusal. It is clear that extrinsic facts might
render such a publication libelous. See note (1926) 12 CoRN. L. QT. 113 and
numerous cases cited. Morrison v. Ritchie, 39 Scot. L. Rep. 432 (1902), to
include the name of a woman as mother in a list of births becomes libelous in
view of the fact that many who read the notice knew that she had been married only one month; Newell v. How, 31 Minn. 235, 17 N. W. 383 (1883), to
write to a concern to whom plaintiff was indebted asking to what extent he
was indebted to them for the -purpose of preparing a financial register was
not libelous as imputing insolvency without some additional facts. But a
subsequent letter advising caution was libelous; McDermott v. Union Credit
Co., 76 Minn. 84, 78 N. W. 967 (1906), publication of the name of a merchant
in a list of delinquent debtors in connection with extrinsic facts showing that
such list is in effect a black list and imputes bad credit, is libelous; Brown v.
Rouillard, 117 Me. 55, 102 Atl. 701 (1917), statement that plaintiff burned his.
buildings is actionable when united by the hearers with facts carrying a charge
of crime, as that the house was insured.
Statutory provisions have been adopted in all code jurisdictions, except
Arizona and Connecticut, providing that it is not necessary to state in the.
complaint any existing fact for the purpose of showing the application to the
plaintiff of the defamatory matter, N. C. Code (1927) §542; Mason's Minn.
Stat. (1927) §9275. Such provision does not obviate the necessity of setting"
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The dissenting opinion was undoubtedly influenced by the misconception that if a publication is not libelous on its face, but only
because of extrinsic facts, it is not "libelous per se" and hence is not
actionable unless special damages are shown.10 This proposition
results from a confusion of slander and libel. In the law of slander,
due to historical accident, three well-defined categories of oral deu
famation were recognized as "actionable per se."1
In all other cases,
it was necessary to prove pecuniary loss.1 2

Consequently the ex-

pression "slanderous per se" has a proper place in our law. Its
meaning is clear although it is subject to the criticism that it is not
reasonable to impose on the law of today such archaic and narrow
categories. But there is no place for the expression "libelous per se"
except as an alternative for "actionable." In the law of libel, it is
excess baggage and results only in confusion.
The great weight of authority and the better reasoning sustain
the view that special damages need not be shown in cases of libel,
even thought the publication is defamatory only by virtue of extrinsic
facts. 13 Where the meaning of written or printed words is clear
out extrinsic facts to show that an apparently harmless statement was in fact
defamatory. Ten Broeck v. Journal Printing Co., 166 Minn. 173, 207 N. W.
497 (1926) ; Carr v. Sun Printing Assoc., 177 N. Y. 131, 69 N. E. 288 (1904);
Clark, The Complaint (1927) 5 N. C. L. REv. 101, 214, 216, 217.
"'This is the view adopted by the dissenting opinion in Sydney v. McFadden Newspaper Pub. Co., 242 N. Y. 208, 151 N. E. 209 (1926). Accord, Ten
Broeck v. Journal Printing Co., 166 Minn. 173, 207 N. W. 497 (1926) ; Wiley
v. Okla. Press Pub. Co., 106 Okla. 52, 233 Pac. 224 (1925) ; Peck v. Pub. Co.,
259 Pac. 307 (Oregon, 1927); Rowan v. Gazette Printing Co., 74 Mont. 326,
239 Pac. 1039 (1925); Fry v. MeCord, 95 Tenn. 678, 33 S. W. 568 (1895);
Tomini v. Cevasco, 114 Cal. 266, 46 Pac. 103 (1896); Tower v. Crosby, 214
App. Div. 392, 212 N. Y. S. 219 (1925).
' In the struggle of the common law courts for supremacy over the spiritual courts jurisdiction of three classes of cases was assumed. This is the
basis for the following classification of cases slanderous per se:
A. Words imputing the commission of an indictable offense involving
moral turpitude-or infamous punishment.
B. Words imputing a contagious disease which would cause person to be
excluded from society (principally venereal disease).
C. Words conveying charge of unfitness, dishonesty or incompetence in an
office of profit, trade or profession, in short, words which tend to prejudice
a man in his calling.
Words not falling strictly within these three categories are only actionable
upon proof of pecuniary loss. POLLOCK, TORTS (12th ed), p. 238; NEWELL,
SLANDER AND LIBEL (4th ed.), §20; note (1925) 14 CAL. L. REV. 61, 62.
'Deese v. Collins, 191 N. C. 749, 133 S. E. 92 (1926), defendant falsely
stated that plaintiff (a white man) had negro blood in his veins. See numerous cases in NEWELL, SLANDER AND LIBEL (4th ed.), pp. 67-70.
Sydney v. McFadden Newspaper Pub. Corp., 242 N. Y. 208, 151 N. E.
209 (1926); 40 HARV. L. REv. 324; 25 MICH. L. REv. 551; Morrison v. Ritchie
and Co., 39 Scottish Law Rep. 432 (1902); Erwin v. Record Pub. Co., 154
Cal. 79, 97 Pac. 21 (1908); Hughes v. Samuels, 170 Iowa 1077, 159 N. W.
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and unambiguous and is alleged to come within the broad definition
of libel as "tending to expose a person to ridicule, contempt, hatred
or degradation of character," it is well settled that words are either
actionable per se, without proof of a pecuniary loss, or are not libelous at all.' 4 There is no good reason for using a different rule
where the written or printed words are ambiguous and are rendered
clear, to the satisfaction of court and jury, by proper innuendo and
explanatory circumstances.' 5 The gist of defamation is injury to
reputation. Consequently, it was not necessary for the plaintiff in
the Duncan case to claim any pecuniary loss.
Ii
PROVING THE TRUTH OF A LIBELOUS CHARGE

"The greater the truth, the greater the libel" was the maxim that
prevailed in criminal prosecutions of libel until the Fox Libel Act
in 1792. Since then, truth has been a defense to a criminal charge
provided it was published in good faith and for justifiable ends,' 6
and, in several states, truth alone is a valid defense to a criminal
17
charge.
In civil cases, from early times, truth has been a complete defense.' 8 There is a social interest in the free cormfiunication of
589 (1916) ; Kee v. Armstrong, 75 Okla. 84, 182 Pac. 494 (1916) ; Pentuff v.
Park, 194 N. C. 146, 138 S. E. 616 (1927) ; Kirkland v. Constitution Pub. Co.,
144 S. E. 821 (Ga. App., 1928). In the cases where a publication states that
the plaintiff is colored, whereas he is actually white, the decisions are unanimous in holding the publication libelous without showing special damages.
Flood v. News and Courier Co., 71 S. C. 112, 50 S. E. 637 (1905); Upton v.
Times-Democrat Pub. Co., 104 La. 141, 28 So. 970 (1900); POLLOCK, TORTS
(12th ed.), pp. 236-238; ODGERS, OUTLINE OF LAW OF LIBEL, p. 3; STRar,
FOUNDATIONS OF LEGAL. LIABILIT, p. 295.
" King v. Lake, Hadres 470, 145 Eng. Rep. R. 552 (1670) ; Cohen v. N. Y.
Times Co., 74 Misc. 618, 132 N. Y. S. 1 (1911); Solverson v. Peterson, 64
Wis. 198, 25 N. W. 14 (1885) ; Paul v. Auction Co., 181 N. C. 1, 105 S. E.
881 (1921) ; 25 Cyc. 244, n. 1, for collection of cases.
To this effect, see note (1926), 14 CALIF. L. REv. 61, discussing Wiley v.
Okla. Press Pub. Co., 106 Okla. 52, 233 Pac. 224 (1925).
"England (E. I.) 6 and 7 Vict. c. 96, §6; California, Pen. Code 1909, §251;
Iowa, Const. Art. 1, §7; Minnesota, Mason's Statutes, §§9904, 10113; New
York, Const. Art. 1, §8; South Carolina, Const. Art 1, §21; Virginia, Code
1904, §3375. For complete list, see HALE, LAW OF PRESS, p. 59, n.
' North Carolina, Consol. Stat., §4638; Indiana, Const. Art. 1, §10; Missouri, Const. Art. 2, §14. For complete list see HALE, LAw OF PRESS, p. 59, n.
3 Blackstone, Com., 125, 126; Foss v. Hildreth, 10 Allen 76 (Mass., 1865) ;
Castle v. Houston, 19 Kan. 417, 27 Am. Rep. 127 (1877) ; Thomson v. Pioneer
Press Co., 37 Minn. 285, 33 N. W. 856 (1887); Nixon v. Dispatch Printing
Co., 101 Minn. 309, 112 N. W. 258 (1907) ; Henderson v. Fox, 83 Ga. 233, 9
S. E. 839 (1889); note (1909) 31 L. R. A. (N. S.) 132, 133, 134, containing
exhaustive list of cases.
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truth. No right to damages, therefore, can be founded on a publication of the truth. The reason for this is said to be "not because
any merit is attached by the law to the disclosure of all truth in
season and out of season, but because of the demerit attaching to the
plaintiff if the imputation is true, whereby he is deemed to have no
ground of complaint for the fact being communicated to his neighbors. It is not that uttering truth always carries its own justification,
but that the law bars the other party of redress which he does not
deserve." 19 Yet the criminal law view, which requires good faith
and justifiable ends, has much to commend it, and we are not surprised to find it followed in some jurisdictions, even in civil cases.
There are a number of judicial decisions, in addition to constitutional and statutory provisions, holding that one who speaks the
truth is not absolutely protected, but that publication of the truth is
conditionally privileged depending on the good faith of the publisher. 20 The publication must not only be true, but the publisher
must act with good motives and justifiable ends.
In Hutchins v. Page,21 the defendant was held liable in an action
of libel for posting notices in the newspapers, advertising sales of
property for delinquent taxes, in addition to posting notices in two
or more public places as he was qualified to do as tax collector by
virtue of statute. The court said, "However the law may be elsewhere, it is well settled in this state that the truth is not always a
defense to an action on the case to recover damages for the publication of a libel. . . . There may be some cases where the occasion
renders, not only the motive, but the truth of the communication
immaterial." New Hampshire is one of the states, mentioned above,
where the publication of truth is only privileged if done "in good
faith, for a justifiable purpose, and with a belief, founded on reasonable grounds, of its truth."
The truth must be as broad as the charge. The libel must be
shown to be substantially true in every material matter. The gist,
"0POLLOCK, ToRTs (12th ed.), p. 260.
" Hutchins v. Page, 75 N. H. 215, 72 Atl. 689, 31 L. R. A. (N. S.) 132
(1909); Burkhart v. N. Am. Co., 214 Pa. 38, 63 Atl. 410 (1906); Illinois,
Const., art. 2, §4, . . . in all trials for libel, both civil and criminal, the truth,
when published with good motives 'and for justifiable ends, shall be a sufficient
defense." This section is typical of similar statutory or constitutional provisions in Maine, Massachusetts, Nebraska, West Virginia. Compare Star
Pub. Co. v. Donahoe, 58 AtI. 513 (Del., 1904).
'Hutchins

(1909).

v. Page, 75 N. H. 215, 72 Atl. 689, 31 L. R. A. (N. S.) 132
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the sting, of the charge must be answered. Where the innuendo
imputes to the facts a particular charge, it is necessary, not only to
prove the truth of the facts, but also the truth of the imputed
charge.2 2 In such a case, the libel is something more than the published material, and that something more must be justified. "The
plea of justification is not sustained unless the evidence goes to prove
every element essential to the truth of the charge imputed to the
28
plaintiff."
Julianv,. Kansas City Star Co.,24 may be used to illustrate. The
words complained of were that the plaintiff, who had been a member
of the legislature, "did well in a legislative way." The innuendo
was that the words imputed bribery. It was held that the words
were capable of that meaning and that it was a question for the jury
as to whether they were used and understood in that sense; that, if
the jury so found, the defendant would have to prove their truth in
that sense in order to justify. There was a strong dissent on the
ground that the words were not fairly susceptible of the construction
placed upon them.
In Warner v. Clark,25 the defendants sent a circular letter to
their customers, stating, among other things, that "Mr. Warner,
formerly in our employ, is no longer so. Our friends and customers
will kindly note the above and give Mr. Warner no recognition on
our account." The plaintiff was held to be entitled to the verdict
in his favor on the ground that the letter insinuated dishonesty and
unreliability. The defendants set up the truth of the facts in the
letter, but it was held that it would be necessary to prove the truth
of the libelous imputation as well.
So in the Duncan case, although every statement was true, and
the author of the letter was the plaintiff himself, the defendant had
to establish the truth of the libelous charge-the solicitation of a
bribe.
It has been suggested that the recognition of the right of privacy
will offer at least a partial escape from the doctrine that truth is a
Duncan v. Record Pub. Co., 143 S. E. 31 (S. C., 1927); Thomson v.

Pioneer Press Co., 37 Minn. 285, 33 N. W. 856 (1887);

NFWELL, SLANDER

(4th ed), §699; note (1909) 31 L. R. A. (N. S.) 132, 136, 137, 140
and cases cited.
Ferguson v. Houston Press Co., 1 S. W. (2d) 387, 393 (Tex. Civ. App.,
1927).
"Julian v. Kansas City Star Co., 309 Mo. 35, 107 S. W. 596 (1907).
"Warner v. Clark, 45 La. Ann. 863, 13 So. 203, 21 L. R. A. 502 (1893).
AND LmBEL
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complete defense in a civil action of libel.2 6 In Brents v. Morgan,2 7
the defendant posted a sign five feet by eight feet in the show window of his garage: "Notice. Dr. W. R. Morgan owes an account
here of $49.67. And if promises would pay an account, this account
would have been settled long ago. This account will be advertised as
long as it remains unpaid." The plaintiff recovered substantial damages on the ground that his right of privacy had been invaded. This
was done without any regard for the truth of the statement published and in face of a Kentucky statute making truth an absolute
defense in a civil action for libel. Such a recognition of a right of
privacy in disclosures of personal affairs, sidesteps the rule that
truth is a defense to libel. It almost brings us back to the old maxim,
"The greater the truth, the greater the libel." Under the Kentucky
decision, it may be that truth as a defense in libel actions is to be
limited to matters of public interest. If Mr. Duncan's letter in the
principal case could be regarded as strictly private, with no public
concern in its publication, then it might be argued that the defendants
were guilty of an intentional invasion of the plaintiff's private
affairs.
The Duncan case is interesting in another aspect because of the
South Carolina rule on the degree of proof, stated in the instructions
of the trial judge, and affirmed by the Supreme Court, as follows:
"Where a libelous publication consists of making a charge of a
crime, and a party seeks to justify, on the ground that the charge
is true, the law of this state requires him to prove the truth of his
charge-that is to say, the truth of the crime-beyond a reasonable
doubt, just as in criminal cases." This is the English rule,28 but
seems to have little following in the United States. Since the rule
requiring proof of a criminal charge beyond a reasonable doubt was
meant for the protection of a person on trial for the commission of
a critne, it should not apply to an affirmative defense in a civil action
where no criminal punishment is involved. 29
' Note (1928) 1 So. CALIF. L. Rav. 293, 296.
Brents v. Morgan, 299 S. W. 967 (Ky., 1927).

'

Cook -. Field, 3 Esp. 133; NEWELL, SLANDER AND Lon. (4th ed.), §698;
Burckhalter v. Coward, 16 S. C. 435 (1881).
SNEWELL, §698; Beck v. Bank, 161 N. C. 201, 76 S. E. 722 (1912) ; Hadley
v. Tinnan, 170 N. C. 84, 86 S. E. 1017 (1915); Anderson v. Savannah Press
Pub. Co., 100 Ga. 454, 28 S. E. 216 (1897); Wilcox v. Moore, 69 Minn. 49,
71 N. W. 917 (1897) ; Barfield v. Brjtt, 47 N. C. 41, 62 Am. Dec. 190 (1854);
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, §2498, n. 5.
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TE

PRIVILEGE OF SELF DEFENSE- -PROVOCATION

"The law of defamation stands apart . . . is not a law requiring
care and caution in a greater or less degree, but is a law of absolute
responsibility qualified by absolute exceptions."' 0 "Certain occasions

excepted, a man defames his neighbor at his peril."'3 1 The exceptional occasions are said to be privileged, i.e., the law, on a balance

of interests, leaves its hands off. What would ordinarily be actionable is permitted on such occasions. The law of defamation recognizes various sorts of privilege-of judicial and legislative proceedings, of communication between persons having a common interest
in the subject matter, of artistic criticism, etc. Thus Senator Dun-

can, speaking in the South Carolina legislature, was not responsible
to anybody for what he said.

Legislative proceedings are absolutely

privileged, even when there is malice.3 2

Most privileges are merely

qualified or conditional in the absence of malice. They are the
occasions where good faith is called for to excuse a publication which

would otherwise be actionable.
The reply of the defendants to Senator Duncan's attack in the

principal case raises the question of whether there is such a privilege as self defense.

It is recognized by Odgers 33 and Newell
35

and by a number of judicial decisions.

4

A privilege of self defense

,oPOLLOCK, ToRrs (12th ed.), p. 565, note (a).
PoLLoc, TORrS. (12th ed.), p. 631, note (k). See article by Jeremiah
Smith, Jones v. Hulton, Three Conflicting Views, 60 U. of PA. L. REv., p. 468.
2 State constitutions contain provisions similar to that of the U. S. Const.,
art. 1, §6, cl.1, that for any speech or debate in either house, members of
Congress shall not be questioned in any place. The English Bill of Rights,
1 Win. & M., §2, ch. 2, contains a similar provision. See PoLLocX, ToRTs,
p. 264; NEWELL, SLANDER AND LIBEL, §352. There is an interesting discussion
by Field, Constitutional Privileges of Legislators, 9 MINN. L. REV. 442 (1925),
in which the author argues that the privilege should not be absolute, but conditional upon the exercise of good faith.
ODGERS, SLANDER AND LIBEL, §229.
NEWELL, §429.
"Duncan v. Record Pub. Co., 131 S. C. 483, 127 S. E. 606 (1925) ; s. c.,
143 S. E. 31 (1927); Shepherd v. Baer, 96 Md. 152, 53 At. 790 (1902);
Brewer v. Chase, 121 Mich. 526, 80 N. W. 575 (1899) ; Smurthwaite v. News
Pub. Co., 124 Mich. 377, 83 N. W. 116 (1900); Preston v. Hobbs, 161 App.
Div. 363, 146 N. Y. S. 419 (1914) ; Ivie v. King, 167 N. C. 174, 83 S. E. 339
(1914); Chafin v. Lynch, 83 Va. 106, 1 S. E. 803 (1887). Indiana refused
to recognize any privilege which would permit setting off one tort against
another, either as a defense or in mitigation of damages. See DePew v. Robinson, 95 Ind. 109 (1883). In Clark v. McBaine, 299 Mo. 77, 252 S. W. 428
(1923), a letter by members of the law faculty of a state university in reply
to a newspaper article by the plaintiff in regard to the latter's dismissal from
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is somewhat incongruous as it seems to call for a lie to answer a lie.
Of course, if the answer is true, the defendant may justify the defamation, and no privilege is needed. It is when the defamatory
answer is false that the defendant seeks to claim a privilege of self
defense.
The mere fact that the plaintiff has previously defamed the defendant is no defense to an action of libel or slander, although it
may result in a mitigation of damages.3 6 In Izde v. King,8 7 the
defendant published an article charging the plaintiff, a lawyer, with
conspiracy to slander. The jury found that the charge was not true
and assessed the damages at $1500. This was affirmed by the North
Carolina Supreme Court. The lower court refused to submit to the
jury an issue whether the article was published in self defense and
whether it was published in good faith and without malice. Such
refusal was held to be proper, the court saying, "The defendant
could have proven in defense the truth of his article, but not that it
was in reply to an attack made upon him. Two wrongs do not make
a right. Nor could he show good faith and the absence of malice
as a defense for the article which is libelous per se. These are matters which could be urged in mitigation of damages only. . . . The
law allows a man to repel a libelous charge by a denial or an explanation. He has a qualified privilege to answer the charge, but it
must be truthful, and not defamatory of his assailant." 38
It is clear that if the answer must be truthful, that is a sufficient
defense, and the existence of a privilege is thereby denied. But the
court goes on to state the rule, as announced by the Michigan court,
"The law justifies a man in repelling a libelous charge by a denial
or an explanation. He has a qualified privilege to answer the
charge; and if he does so in good faith, and what he publishes is
fairly an answer, and is published for the purpose of repelling the
charge, and not with malice, it is privileged, though it be false (italics
ours). The court will determine whether the occasion is one which
justifies such publication, but the question of good faith-4.e., malice
the faculty, was held privileged because necessary to protect defendant's interests and because the affairs of a state university are a proper subject for
comment.
Sternberg Mfg. Co. v. Miller, etc., Mfg. Co., 170 Fed. 298, 18 Ann. Cas.
69 and note (C. C.A. 8th, 1909) ; Stewart v. Minn. Tribune Co., 41 Minn. 71,
42 N. W. 787 (1889) ; Ivie v. King, 167 N. C. 174, 83 S. E. 339 (1914).
Ivie v. King, 167 N. C. 174, 83 S. E. 339 (1914).
167 N. C. 174, 177, 83 S. E. 339, 340.

DEVELOPMENT IN NEWSPAPER LIBEL
-is for the jury.... The thing published must be something in
the nature of an answer, like an explanation or denial. What is
said must have some connection with the charge that is sought to be
repelled." 3 9
It is to be noted that, although every man has a right to defend
his character against false aspersion, 40 the reply must be pertinent
and fairly arising from the charge and not malicious. The limitations of the privilege are implicit in the words "self defense." Just
as one who is threatened with physical violence may defend himself
with such force as is necessary to repel the attack, so one whose character is defamed may impugn his opponent's veracity and give his
own version of the matter in dispute, provided he acts in good faith
and does no more than is reasonably necessary to uphold his own
reputation. He must not intrude unnecessarily into the private life
41
of his attacker.
This privilege of self defense, like all qualified privileges, may
be lost by too wide a publication. The method or extent of publishing the answer may exceed or destroy the privilege. An attack made
orally before a few people does not call for a reply in the newspaper
or over the radio. The reply must be aimed at reaching the audience
which heard the attack. In Adam v. Ward,42 the plaintiff made a
speech in the House of Commons defamatory of an army general,
who referred the matter to the Army Council. The defendant, as
secretary of the Army Council, wrote a letter to the general vindicating the latter and making defamatory statements of the plaintiff.
This letter was given to the press to be published. The House of
Lords held that the publication of the letter was not too wide, Lord
Dunedin saying, "The ambit of the contradiction should be spread so
wide as, if possible, to meet the false accusation wherever it went.
Do what you will, the stem chase after a lie that has got the start
'43
is apt to be a long one."
The charge of the trial judge in the Duncan case, when taken
as a whole, recognized this privilege of self defense, both as a bar
to the action and in mitigation of damages. This was approved by
the South Carolina Supreme Court,44 following its first decision in
Brewer v. Chase, 121 Mich. 526, 80 N. W. 575, 577 (1899).

oNEWELL, SLANDER AND LIBEL
NEWELL, §429.

(4th ed.), §429.

a Adam v. Ward [1917] A. C. 309.

"Ibid. p.324.

"Duncan v. Record Pub. Co., 143 S. E. 31, 55-57.
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the Duncan case,4 5 where the issue was directly raised by the action
of the lower court in striking out a special plea that the matter complained of was published to explain and deny charges which the
plaintiff had made against' defendants in a speech in the legislature.
The lower court based its action on the ground that the plaintiff's
speech was privileged. On appeal it was held that the defense was
a proper one and should have been allowed to stand. Thus the
application of the privilege of self defense to the Duncan case is
recognized. The letter was published as an answer to the plaintiff's
vituperative attack. Just because the plaintiff's own speech was
privileged from any legal action, it does not follow that it could
not be refuted. Otherwise every man's reputation is at the mercy
of members of any legislature. Senator Duncan's speech called for
reply. Was the publication of the letter in question a proper answer
or was it an unnecessary intrusion into Senator Duncan's private
affairs? Were the defendants acting in good faith or were they
influenced by malice toward the plaintiff ? These very difficult questions had to be answered by the jury, and the verdict was for the
plaintiff.
Even if self defense should not be accorded the place of a privilege, there are many occasions when the plaintiff's defamatory attack should be considered as a provocation of the defendant's reply,
and such provocation should go toward the mitigation of damages.
The law makes allowance for what is done in anger and in the heat
of passion. 6
IV
SUGGESTED NEWSPAPER PRIVILEGE OF PUBLISHING TRUE FACTS
CONCERNING PUBLIC OFFICERS

"The process of continual readjustment between the needs of
society and the protection of individual rights is nowhere more conspicuous than in the history of the law of defamation. If we look
back to the time when the law defining that offense became substantially settled, we find prevailing a conception of such relative
rights which is in many respects the antithesis of that which prevails
"'Duncan v. Record Pub. Co., 131 S.C. 483, 127 S. E. 606 (1925), commented upon in 24 MicH. L. Rav. 74. See also (1924) 8 MINN. L. REV. 623,
discussing a case in which there was a mutual exchange of opprobrious
ephithets.
"Stewart v. Minn. Tribune Co., 41 Minn. 71, 42 N. W. 787 (1889) ; Myle
v. King, 167 N. C. 174, 83 S.E. 339 (1914) ; Duncan v. Record Pub. Co., 143
S. E. 31 (S.C., 1927); NE ELL, §429.
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today. Yet the law defining the affirmative offense, with its rigorous
presumptions of falsity, malice, and damage, remains practically unchanged. It seems to have been thought that the vast increase in
facility and area of communication, resulting from the use of the
post, the telephone, the telegraph, and the modern printing press,
justified the stringent principles of the law which had been formulated before such methods of communication were dreamed of. The
development of the law, in accommodation to this vast change in the
means of communication, has been in the direction of enlarging the
scope of those principles of immunity, or privilege, some perception
of which was coeval with the beginnings of the law upon the subject.
Certain fundamental considerations have guided this growth. Immunity in defamation implies some freedom in the publication of
matter which proves to be mistaken or false. It follows, necessarily,
that persons defamed must suffer without remedy. The plainest
principles of justice require, therefore, that immunity should be
granted only
within such limits as can be justified upon reasonable
47
grounds."
Every person has a right to comment on matters of public interest and general concern, provided he does so fairly and with an
honest purpose.4 8 Affairs of government, activities of public officials and qualifications of candidates for office are privileged subjects of discussion because everyone in a given community, in theory
at least, is concerned with the conduct of his public servants. 49 A
search through the advance sheets of the past year shows that a preponderance of the libel cases involved comment or criticism of public
officials or candidates for office. 50 All of these cases reaffirm the
general rule that reasonable and fair comment and criticism, as distinguished from allegation of fact, of the acts and conduct of a public
officer are qualifiedly privileged. "The conduct of public officers
being open to public criticism, it is for the interest of society that
their acts may be freely published with fitting comment or strictures.""' "It is not only the privilege but the duty of every citizen
'"Veeder, Freedom of Public Discussion,23 HAgv. L. Rav. 413 (1910).
'"POLLocn, TORTS (12th ed.) p. 255; NEvWELL, SLANDER AND LIBEL (4th
ed.) §477; 11 MINN. L. REV. 474 (1927). See cases in note 50.

. Jones, Interest and Duty in Relation to Qualified Privilege, 22 MIcH. L.

REV. 437, 439 (1924).

' Ferguson v. Houston Press Co., 1 S. W. (2d) 387 (Tex. Civ. App.,
1927) ; Eva v. Smith, 264 Pac. 803 (Calif., 1928) ; Jenkins v. Taylor, 4 S.W.
(2d) 656 (Tex. Civ. App., 1928) ; Houston Press v. Smith, 3 S.W. (2d) 900
(Tex. Civ. App., 1928); Peck v. Coos Bay Times Pub. Co., 259 Pac. 307
(Wash., 1927) ; State v. Cox, 298 S. W. 837 (Mo., 1927) ; Jones v. Express
Pub. Co., 262 Pac. 78 (Calif., 1927); Morley v. Post Pub. Co., 268 Pac. 540

(Colo., 1928).

" Eva v. Smith, 264 Pac. 803, 805 (Calif., 1928).
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and every newspaper to fairly and impartially criticise the faults and
'52
misconduct of public officers."
In general, the facts which are stated as the basis of any privileged comment or criticism must be true.53 The privilege of fair
comment does not extend to untrue statements of fact. In England,
it is customary to plead fair comment as follows: "In so far as the
words are statements of fact, the same are true in substance and in
fact, and in so far as they consist of comment they are fair and
bona fide comment upon a matter of public interest."5 4 This is
called the "rolled up" plea. It is necessary because comment must
be made on accurate facts. "If a defendant cannot show that his
comments contain no misstatements of fact, he cannot prove a de55
fense of fair comment."
In cases dealing with candidates for public office, there is a split
of authority in the United States in fair comment cases as to the
necessity that the facts stated be true. The English rule is generally
followed, the leading case being Post Publishing Co. v. Hallam.5 6
It was held by Taft, then circuit judge, that while criticism and comment are privileged, if made in good faith, yet false allegations of
fact are not privileged, although made in the best of faith. To hold
otherwise will drive honorable and worthy men from politics. "The
privilege should always cease where the sacrifice of the individual
right becomes so great that the public good to be derived from it is
outweighed. '57 However, there is strong authority holding that this
qualified privilege may extend to false statements of fact concerning
public officers if made without malice and on probable cause.5 8 In
'Jones v. Express Pub. Co., 262 Pac. 78, 84 (Calif., 1927).

' Veeder, Freedom of Public Discussion, 23 HARV. L. lEv. 413, 415 (1910);
§483. See note (1922) 7 CORN. L. Qr.389, discussing Hyman v. Press
Pub. Co., 192 N. Y. S. 47 (1922), publication of slacker lists erroneously containing plaintiff's name.
' Note (1924) 158 Law Times 423, discussing Sutherland v. Stopes (1925),
A. C. 47.
Digby v. Financial News [1907] 1 K. B. 502, 507.
"'Post Pub. Co. v. Hallam, 59 Fed. 530 (C. C. A. 6th, 1893); Burt v. Advertiser Co., 154 Mass. 238, 28 N. E. 1 (1891) ; Hall v. Ewing, 140 La. 907,
74 So. 190 (1917); Ferguson v. Houston Press Co., 1 S. W. (2d) 387 (Tex.
Civ. App., 1927); Jenkins v. Taylor, 4 S. W. (2d) 656 (Tex. Civ. App.,
1928) ; State v. Cox, 298 S. W. 837 (Mo., 1927) ; Arizona Pub. Co. v. Harris,
20 Ariz. 446, 181 Pac. 373 (1919) ; Bingham v. Gaynor, 203 N. Y. 27, 96 N. E.
84 (1911); Pattangall v. Mooers, 113 Me. 412, 94 Atl. 561, L. R. A. 1918E
14 and note.
" Post Pub. Co. v. Hallam, 59 Fed. 530, 540 (C. C. A. 6th, 1893).
' Coleman v. MacLennan, 78 Kan. 711, 98 Pac. 281 (1908); Salinger v.
Cowles, 195 Iowa 873, 191 N. W. 167 (1923); Friedell v. Blakely Printing
NEWELL,
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the leading case 59 sustaining this view, it is argued that the real issue
is good faith and bad faith. If the publication is in good faith, then
the publication of facts, which prove to be false, does not destroy
the privilege. The public interest is paramount and without this
rule, the press is helpless to open up on crooks. In practice, one
rule seems to work about as well as the other.
The privilege of fair comment seems to include the suggested
privilege of newspapers to publish true facts in matters of public
concern. The privilege of fair comment and criticism, when based
on admittedly true facts, is now well established. 60 If a newspaper
may publish fair comments in addition to true facts, it seems to
follow that the true facts may be published without comment. Is
the defendant to be penalized for doing less than he might have done
under the existing privilege?
In the Duncan case, no comment is made at all. The facts stated
are literally true in every detail. If the privilege of fair comment
does not apply because there is entire absence of comment, then the
law should recognize a new privilege-that of a newspaper to publish true facts concerning public officers. As indicated above, the
concept of immunity or privilege has been the growing point in the
law of defamation. The situation illustrated by the Duncan case
seems to require an absolute immunity. It is the only way to give
proper protection to a newspaper which is concerning itself with
the conduct of public officers. In the Duncan case,. the jury found
malice, and that finding would have negatived any conditional privilege. It is probably true that the jury was confused by the standard
definitions of malice in the charge of the trial judge, which confused
legal malice, that fictitious presumption in every libel case, with
actual malice or bad faith. While we cannot escape the feeling that
the defendants were harshly treated in the Duncan case, yet, in view
of the present state of the law, the blame, if any, seems to fall on the
jury. Even a recognition of a conditional privilege in this case
would probably not have affected the verdict.
What is needed in the law of libel to safeguard the public as
against the politician and the holder of public office is an absolute
Co., 163 Minn. 226, 203 N. W. 974 (1925); Lewis v. Carr, 178 N. C. 578, 101
S. E. 97 (1919), falsehood of charge not sufficient to establish malice.
"Coleman v. MacLennan, 78 Kan. 711, 98 Pac. 281 (1908), elaborate opinion by Burch, J.

' See notes 48, 49, 50.
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privilege rather than a conditional one. The suggested absolute
privilege is narrow enough. It should apply only to newspapers.
The printed page is more impersonal and permanent, and the newspaper is the most important factor in the formation of public opinion.
The suggested privilege is further limited by its subject matterpublic officers and candidates for office. It is also limited to the publication of true facts. The reader is free to draw his own inferences.
A newspaper should not be responsible under these limitations. How
else can the public be protected against the politician? This is important because of a tendency today to throttle the public press by
politicians who are afraid of being exposed.6 1 The suggested privilege is aimed at protecting the public interest. In case a newspaper
publishes true facts concerning a politician, the risk of defamatory
inferences should fall on him. That is the price he must pay for
being a servant of the people. The situation calls for an absolute
privilege because of the tendencies of juries to find malice too easily,
partly due to the confusion in the law of libel between legal and
actual malice. It must be remembered too that the plaintiff can
often practically take his choice of any county in the state from
which to draw the jury, since he may, under usual rules of venue,
sue in any county where the newspaper circulates.
Such an absolute privilege swings the balance in favor of the
public interest, although individual hardship may occasionally result.
This risk of injury to individuals, who happen to hold public office
or are candidates for office, is more than offset by the public advantage in being made aware of the true facts.62 The Duncan case
suggests the problem and the solution.
'There is some indication of this in Minnesota, Pub. Laws 1925, ch. 285,
1held to be constitutional in State ex rel Olson v. Guilford, 219 N. W. 770
(Minn., 1928). The decision seems to be correct, but the statute which renders enjoinable as a nuisance "any person ...engaged in the business of
regularly or customarily publishing ... a malicious, scandalous and defamatory newspaper..." shows a tendency which may become dangerous to a
free press.
I See Hallen, The Texas Libel Laws, 5 Tax. L. Ray. 335, 358, commenting
on Texas Pub. Laws (1927), ch. 80, to the effect that the new law creates an
absolute privilege in newspapers in reporting what takes place in judicial,
legislative and public meetings.
An absolute privilege of the sort suggested in the text would probably violate the constitutional provisions in a number of states that truth is not a
defense unless accompanied by good motives and justifiable ends, Where
such constitutional provisions exist, the immunity could be conditional at
least, and- the jury could be left with the question of actual malice under a
charge which made the distinction with implied malice clear.

